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Performing ‘the Spirit of ’76’: U.S. Historical Memory and Counter-Commemorations for 
American Indian Sovereignty   
 
 
"When they light the candles on the 200th year birthday cake, we will be there to blow them out."  
Unnamed leader of the American Indian Movement, February 1976.1 
 
At a June 1976 Congressional hearing, the United States Senate reviewed a list of 
potential domestic terrorist organizations. In addition to the usual suspects such as the 
Weatherman and the Puerto Rican independence movement, the list included an organization 
called the American Indian Movement (AIM). AIM had become infamous for their 
confrontational demonstration tactics that involved the takeover of tribal and U.S. government 
property, and armed standoffs with federal forces. However, the immediate impetus for the Ford 
Administration to officially designate AIM as a terrorist group was their fear that these Indian 
militants might disrupt the summer 1976 official commemorations of the Bicentennial - the 200th 
anniversary of the 1776 issuing of the American Declaration of Independence. Even more than 
their image as gun-toting Indians, what made AIM a threat to the U.S. government were their 
creative and media savvy use of sites and anniversaries of American national memory to make 
statements about historical grievances and the pressing need for justice for American Indians. 
Approaching its topic from the intersection of History, Memory Studies and Performance 
Studies, this article will advance the concept of counter-commemorations in its investigation of 
the ways in which Native American activists used U.S. national historical memory to make 
interventions for expanded Indian sovereignty rights in the Late Cold War. In their efforts to 
educate the public and influence policy, American Indian activists held counter-commemorations 
in which they performed Native critiques of the Anglo-centered view of the American past, and 
used media attention to push for historical and social justice for Native Americans. Drawing on 
public and declassified government documents, AIM-related archival collections, newspaper 
                                                          
1 “Threats to the Peaceful Observance of the Bicentennial. Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate the 
Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary, 
United States Senate, Ninety-Fourth Congress, Second Session, June 18, 1976.” U.S. Government Printing Office, 
Washington, 1976., 9, 30, Online. 
http://ia700305.us.archive.org/2/items/threatstopeacefu00unit/threatstopeacefu00unit.pdf Accessed January 16, 2014 
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accounts and memoirs, this article2 argues that radical Native sovereignty activists strategically 
used the position of Indians in the Euro-American cultural imagination and national memory as 
leverage to push for the recognition of enhanced sovereignty rights. Using Diana Taylor’s 
Performance Studies concept of scenarios, I will analyze several Indian interventions in U.S. 
historical memory, and by placing them in historical context, I will establish counter-
commemorations as part of a calculated strategy of the radical Indian sovereignty movement 
during the Late Cold War and beyond, and as a counter use of official memory by social 
movements, which productively complicates currently existing categories in Memory Studies.  
Definitions 
In his scholarship of U.S. public memory, John Bodnar distinguished two co-existing, 
often competing forms of culture: “vernacular” and “official.” He identified vernacular memory 
as sub-national, belonging to families and neighborhoods, and he also counted war veterans and 
their kin and social networks as vernacular figures. According to Bodnar, vernacular culture is 
often based on personal or family experience, and has specialized and mutable interests and 
stakes in ‘memory work.’ “Official” culture, on the other hand, is most often represented by 
national political leaders, who try to establish and maintain national unity and continuity, and 
loyalty to the status quo. “Public memory,” according to Bodnar, “emerges from the intersection 
of official and vernacular cultural expressions.”3 Yet such dichotomies are often complicated by 
cases like the fall 2006 riots in Budapest, where ultranationalists both commemorated and 
attempted to ‘complete’ the 1956 Hungarian uprising against the Soviet-backed Communist 
regime, or when in the late Cold War American Indians ‘hijacked’ U.S. commemorations of the 
national past to campaign for Native sovereignty rights. These cases suggest that the groups 
Bodnar would call “vernacular” sometimes draw on and strategically use national historical 
memory in an oppositional fashion for their own sociopolitical causes.  
                                                          
2 This article is part of a project I am conducting at the Centre for Collective Memory Research (Centra pro výzkum 
kolektivní paměti) at the Institute of International Studies, Charles University, Prague, the Czech Republic. It 
writing also benefited from a research residency of the author at the International Forum for U.S. Studies at the 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign in 2014. 
3 John Bodnar, “Public Memory in an American City: Commemoration in Cleveland,” In John R. Gillis, ed., 
Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994.), 74-
75; also John Bodnar, Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration, and Patriotism in the Twentieth 
Century (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1992), 13-14 
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Because theoretical dichotomies often fail to capture the complexities of such cases, 
rather than defining the nature of collective memory,4 here I focus on its manifestations – the 
politics of commemorations as a social and cultural form. Accordingly, this article treats 
commemorations as performances of memory – interventions in the struggles of the present by 
re-enacting or challenging socially constructed categories (such as ‘race,’ ethnicity or political 
status) projected back in the past. Commemorations and commemorative events are bracketed in 
time and/or space in a way as to clearly signal that they are meant to be performances or can be 
interpreted as such.5 
These Native performances of U.S. national memory of the late Cold War were protest 
performances for American Indian sovereignty rights. The concept of social protest as 
performance was introduced by Richard Schechner in the 1970s and subsequently elaborated in 
scholarship by Rebekah J. Kowal and others. In analyzing the 1960 civil rights sit-ins in 
Greensboro, North Carolina as “staged events,” Kowal concurs with Schechner that 
performances for social protest are communicative events, and are often designed as such.6 
Kowal convincingly argues that the Greensboro student activists exercised a kind of 
“scenographic oversight” over their actions, taking into account their visual and verbal rhetorical 
impact.7 Thus, their “[alternative] reality was enacted as a scripted if improvised performance.”8 
Scholarship about the American Indian sovereignty movement’s major events confirms that AIM 
and other activists likewise understood their performance interventions as public events by which 
they could communicate their messages and champion their causes through television and 
                                                          
4 The seminal works that laid down the definitions and initial theoretical framework of collective memory studies 
include Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory (Heritage of Sociology Series, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1992) and Jan Assman, “Collective Memory and Cultural Identity, ” New German Critique, No. 65, Cultural 
History/Cultural Studies (Spring - Summer, 1995), pp. 125-133. 
5 In this article I analyze performances of  the first order as defined by Diana Taylor: “‘Performance’, on one level, 
constitutes the object of analysis in performance studies, that is, the many practices and events  - dance, theatre, 
ritual, political rallies, funerals - that involve theatrical, rehearsed, or conventional/event-appropriate behaviors. 
These practices are usually bracketed from those around them to constitute discrete objects of analysis. Sometimes, 
that framing is part of the event itself - a particular dance or a rally has a beginning and an end; it does not run 
continuously or seamlessly into other forms of cultural expression.” Diana Taylor, The Archive and the Repertoire 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 3 
6 Rebekah J. Kowal, “Staging the Greensboro Sit-Ins,” (The Drama Review, Winter 2004, Vol. 48, No. 4), 137 
7 Ibid., 138 
8 Ibid., 150 
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printed media – and that their scripts were often complemented by on-the-spot improvisation and 
impulsive decision-making.9 The fact that national commemorations and historic sites generally 
rely on spectacle likewise conditioned the social protest events staged by AIM and other groups.  
Native sovereignty rights are historically constructed, and between the 16th and the mid-
20th century they were dramatically curtailed not only in Euro-American law and federal policy, 
but also in the actual practices of Indian relations on the ground, which began with trading and 
treaty making and lasted through Indian removal, reservations and boarding schools, and reached 
their nadir with the Termination Policy of the World War Two Era. From the various and 
repeated articulations of American Indian rights over 500 years, here I am focusing on the 
sovereignty rights struggles in the 1970s and 1980s – the Late Cold War. In this period, Native 
goals included the full scope of collective rights – extending to those of fully independent 
countries. This struggle was spearheaded by a variety of Native American organizations, of 
which I am focusing on the American Indian Movement and their allies. 
As a U.S. social group, American Indians continue to face a peculiar situation: their 
numbers are very small in the overall U.S. population (at just under 3 million, American Indians 
and Alaska Natives amount to less than one percent of the total US population10), which means 
they have little and rather localized political power. Yet the prominence of “the Indian” as an 
imaginary figure in U.S. culture (a topic which has been analyzed by Philip J. Deloria in his 1998 
book Playing Indian11) has provided leverage for Native activists in their relations with Euro-
Americans. I argue that this cultural prominence has also meant a relatively powerful position of 
Indians in mainstream U.S. national memory. Because the American Indian Movement is usually 
remembered for their confrontational tactics (such as at Wounded Knee in 1973) and the deaths 
and court cases associated with their struggle (the killing of two FBI agents and one Indian in 
1975 and the subsequent sentencing of AIM member Leonard Peltier to life in prison), scholars 
have not paid enough attention to AIM’s strategic interventions in U.S. national memory for 
                                                          
9 Paul Chaat Smith and Robert Allen Warrior, Like a Hurricane: The Indian Movement from Alcatraz to Wounded 
Knee (New York: The New Press, 1996), ix 
10 US Census Bureau 2010 Census Briefs, March 2011. Online. 
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf  Accessed September 20, 2014. 
11 Philip J. Deloria, Playing Indian (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1998) 
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Indian sovereignty rights. These interventions involved the takeover of memorials and 
commemorative sites of U.S. national memory.  
Scenarios in U.S. National Memory 
This study makes the claim that Native activists used commemorations of the U.S. 
national past as scenarios for protest re-enactments of American Indian history. Native counter-
commemorations relied on the scenarios of US public memory to stage their protests. Introduced 
by Performance Studies scholar Diana Taylor, a scenario is “simultaneously setup and action,” 
which “frame and activate social dramas.”12 A scenario is something that has precedent, but its 
outcome is not pre-determined – it has a range of possible outcomes.  
According to Roger I. Simon, “historical representations are practices that deliberately 
attempt to shape social memory. Such practices seek [either] to maintain or reinterpret dominant 
narratives, revive marginal ones, or bring to light those formerly suppressed, unheard or 
unarticulated.”13 Shaped by the most dominant historical representations, many of the myths of 
US national memory can serve as scenarios for re-play: the stories of Pocahontas, Thanksgiving, 
the Boston Tea Party and the American Revolution, national battlefields, episodes from the lives 
of presidents, and others. While they are usually formulaic in their outcome, the 
commemorations of these events and people can still serve to re-activate their scenarios for the 
struggles of the present.14 It was this dramatic dimension of the commemorations of national 
history that the American Indian Movement used to perform critiques of Euro-American 
historical memory that pushed for Native sovereignty rights.  
                                                          
12 Diana Taylor, The Archive and the Repertoire (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 28.  
13 Roger I. Simon, “Forms of Insurgency in the Production of Popular Memories: The Columbus Quincentenary and 
the Pedagogy of Countercommemoration.” In Henry A. Giroux, Peter McLaren, eds., Between Borders: Pedagogy 
and the Politics of Cultural Studies (New York: Routledge, 1994), 130 
14 There is a scholarly consensus that in general, the observing parties of any commemoration make use of the past 
to make statements about the struggles of the present. Thus, commemorations show that historical memory itself is 
contested ground. For more on this, see John Bodnar, Remaking America: Public Memory, Commemoration and 
Patriotism in the Twentieth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992), Richard Handler and Eric 
Gable, The New History at an Old Museum: Creating the Past at Colonial Williamsburg (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1997), Katherine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone, eds., Contested Pasts: The Politics of Memory (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2003), John R. Gillis, ed., Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), David W. Blight, Race and Reunion: The Civil War in 
American Memory (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 2001), and Richard M. Fried, 
The Russians Are Coming! The Russians Are Coming! Pageantry and Patriotism in Cold-War America (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1998). 
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 In their interventions in U.S. historical memory for sovereignty rights, Native activists 
used what I call “counter-commemorations.” A counter-commemoration is when a group 
commemorates a historical event by claiming the mantle of one of the social actors who were 
involved in the “original” event; they usually also identify another current group as their 
“original” opponent; and they confrontationally attempt to carry out a political project related to 
the original historical event. With this, the particular group inscribes their present agendas on the 
past through their commemorative performance. Counter-commemorations stand out from other 
commemorative events in the extent and forcefulness of the group which asserts its vision of the 
past in the present.  
Scenario I: Thanksgiving, Plymouth, 1970 
 In the fall of 1970, Massachusetts state officials asked descendant of the Wampanoag 
nation Frank James to give the keynote address at the state dinner commemorating the 350th 
anniversary of the landing of the Pilgrims at Plymouth Rock. When his planned speech was 
deemed too critical and dropped from the program, James and the United Indians of New 
England appealed to Native Americans across the country to join them at a demonstration in 
Plymouth on Thanksgiving. Among the hundreds of activists who gathered were members of the 
American Indian Movement as well as some from Indians of All Tribes, the group who occupied 
the island of Alcatraz at the time. The demonstrators declared Thanksgiving a “Day of 
Mourning” for American Indians. However, what was planned by the Wampanoag as a 
ceremony of mourning before the official state celebration soon turned more confrontational as 
AIM leaders like Russell Means started giving speeches from the base of the statue of Massasoit, 
the Wampanoag leader who played a key role in Plymouth Colony’s early survival. Asserting 
that Plymouth Rock was red with Indian blood, Means told tourists and demonstrators that 
“today you will see the Indian reclaim the Mayflower in a symbolic gesture to reclaim our rights 
in this country.” Next, Native activists buried Plymouth Rock in sand while an Indian in regalia 
performed an Omaha funeral dirge. After this ceremony, demonstrators climbed aboard the 
Mayflower II, the replica of the 17th century ship of the Pilgrims. As Means continued orating 
about current issues confronting the Native American population, activists replaced the ship’s 
flag with the U.S. flag upside down (an AIM trademark signaling distress). When activists threw 
overboard a dummy Pilgrim replica, police moved in and cleared the ship without resistance. To 
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journalists of the local and national media, Means characterized the event as “a new kind of 
Boston Tea Party. Only this time the Indians are for real!”15 To top off the counter-
commemoration, AIM activists crashed the local period dress banquet, turning over tables full of 
traditional American Thanksgiving food. Meanwhile, John Trudell and his Alcatraz veterans 
doused Plymouth Rock in red paint.16 
 Media coverage, memoires and photographs support my claim that the takeover of the 
1970 Plymouth Thanksgiving celebration by American Indian rights activists was a counter-
commemoration. In addition to the on-site speeches and statements to the press at Plymouth, at 
least two of the extant photographs of the demonstration compositionally positioned Russell 
Means as a descendant of Massasoit, overlapping with the statue in both visual angle and 
posture, thus in a sense vetriloquizing the Wampanoag leader. The difference in this counter-
commemoration is not only between the statue’s Greek-inspired noble-savage near-nudity and 
Means’ 1970s clothing, but also in the AIM leader’s raised arm and fist, and the passion in his 
face, contrasting with the essentialized stoicism of Massasoit’s expression.17  
 The scenario of Thanksgiving in US national memory is a story of European religious 
arrival and taking possession of Native North America – with American Indians playing a role of 
passivity and the kind of magnanimous assistance as they in effect bequeath their land and 
heritage to the “Pilgrims.” The Native counter-commemoration of 1970 re-activated this 
officially sanctioned scenario of national memory, and through their active disruptions of their 
role and the story, they staged a commemorative intervention for social justice.  
                                                          
15 Summary of events synthesized from “While the Nation Feasted… Indians Bury ‘That Rock’ at Plymouth.” From 
The New York Times. Akwesasne Notes January-February 1971, 8-9; “National Day of Mourning,” Akwesasne Notes 
Fall 1971, 38. Underground Newspaper Collection. Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, 
Albuquerque; Dennis Banks and Richard Erdoes. Ojibwa Warrior: Dennis Banks and the Rise of the American 
Indian Movement (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004), 111-3; Russell Means with Marvin J. Wolf. 
Where White Men Fear to Tread: The Autobiography of Russell Means (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 176-
7; and “The Suppressed Speech of Wamsutta (Frank B.) James, Wampanoag, to have been delivered at Plymouth, 
Massachusetts, 1970,” United American Indians of New England website, http://www.uaine.org/ Accessed January 
16, 2014 
16 Banks and Erdoes 113 
17 Respectively, Bill Purdy, “Thanksgiving Day 1970: Russell Means Raises a Fist for Indian Power at Plymouth,” 
“While the Nation Feasted… Indians Bury ‘That Rock’ at Plymouth.” From The New York Times. Akwesasne Notes 
January-February 1971, 8-9, and AP Wide World photo of Russell Means at Thanksgiving 1970. Online. 
http://quezaltepeque.blogspot.com/2007_08_01_archive.html . Accessed January 16, 2014, also featured in Means 
and Wolf, among photographs after page 206. 
9 
 
 One year after the events, the Native rights movement’s flagship newspaper Akwesasne 
Notes again called on “Native Americans to come together at the one time out of the year when 
people remember that Indians gave something to this country […] This is the one day when they 
will all listen.”18 In addition to their Plymouth speeches, the takeover of the ship, the disruption 
of the state banquet, and the burying and painting of the famous rock, the newspaper’s phrasing 
is further evidence that from U.S. national memory Native activists identified and re-
appropriated the anniversary of Thanksgiving, an official public history form, to stage their own 
commemoration of the original events, with a different function: an intervention for American 
Indian rights.  
Scenario II: Wounded Knee, 1973 
Possibly the most dramatic event of the American Indian rights struggle was the February 
1973 takeover of the village of Wounded Knee by Oglala Sioux traditionalists and the militant 
activists of the American Indian Movement. During the ensuing 71-day standoff, the occupiers 
held their ground in the face of overwhelming pressure – and firepower - from the Pine Ridge 
Reservation tribal police, South Dakota state troopers, the FBI, federal marshals, and the 
American military – the full force of the United States government.19 The demands of the 
occupiers – a federal investigation into the wrongdoings of tribal chairman Dick Wilson, the 
reinstatement of the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty as the basis of relations between the U.S. 
government and the Sioux Indians, and amnesty for all in the village – were only partially met by 
a government that stalled, negotiated, hedged its bets, and tried to wear out those in the Knee by 
sealing the roads, imposing a media blackout, and keeping the village under withering gunfire 
that cost the lives of two Indians.  
                                                          
18 “National Day of Mourning,” Akwesasne Notes Fall 1971, 38. Emphasis added. 
19 In addition to references to history repeating itself, the occupiers, their outside allies as well as the government 
forces also made explicit analogies between Wounded Knee 1973 and the U.S. involvement in Vietnam, suggesting 
that international dimension of the Cold War also provided the participants with another scenario: that of the 
perimeter battles between the American military and a guerillaarmy partly made up of civilians. See, respectively, 
Thom Marlowe, Pacific News Service / Liberation News Service, “The Frontier Moves West: The U.S. Has Got 
Itself Some New Indians,” in Akwesasne Notes, March-May 1972,  32; John Nichols, “Lieutenant William Calley, 
Meet Kit Carson” (originally The New Mexican, June-July 1971) in July-Aug 1971, 40-1; “The Fruits of Racism” in 
April-June 1972, 34; Akwesasne Notes April 1973, 43,Underground Newspaper Collection; Means and Wolf 279, 
Smith and Warrior 206, 207; Woody Kipp, Viet Cong at Wounded Knee: The Trail of a Blackfeet Activist (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2004), 126; Banks and Erdoes 163, 176 
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The 1973 occupation of Wounded Knee carried with it an acute sense of history 
potentially repeating itself.  In a speech to his Oglala traditionalist allies that was carried by one 
of the television news networks, Russell Means described the planned occupation this way: 
“When we seize Wounded Knee, either we force the federal government to kill us all once again 
like they did 83 years ago at Wounded Knee – or else to come out and they negotiate and meet 
our demands.”20 For their own part, the media amplified the commemorative dimension of the 
siege with sensationalistic gusto: Time magazine bombastically remarked that Wounded Knee 
felt as if “history had been hijacked by a band of revisionists armed with a time machine.”21 Such 
formulations speak to the very force of this performative intervention in U.S. national memory. 
To use Taylor’s framework, with their performance Native rights activists reactivated the 
scenario of the original event of Wounded Knee: the massacre of Big Foot’s band by the US 7th 
Cavalry in 1890. As the government issued ultimatum after ultimatum to the Indians to stand 
down, there was a clear sense that a gathering of traditionalist Indians may once again be 
massacred by the U.S. military.22 Scholars of the American Indian rights struggle Smith and 
Warrior point out that during the siege, the chief U.S. government negotiators wanted above all 
else to avoid having another massacre – to avoid having the Wounded Knee of 1890 repeated at 
the Wounded Knee of 1973.23 It was this kind of performative use of U.S. national memory that 
provided leverage for the occupiers against the overwhelming power of the United States 
government: in order not to repeat history, the Nixon administration had to negotiate about 
Indian sovereignty.24 
                                                          
20 “Wounded Knee – Occupation ’73.” Online. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gRcAYOIhx4Y Accessed 
January 16, 2014 
21 Smith & Warrior 207 
22 Smith & Warrior 205, 207; “Wounded Knee – Occupation ’73.” Online. 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gRcAYOIhx4Y Accessed January 16, 2014; See Carol Talbert, “Wounded Knee: 
1973” April 1973, 15-17. Self-standing manuscript. Carol Sullivan Papers, Center for Southwest Research, The 
University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico. 
23 Smith and Warrior 205 
24 Scholar of post-Communist collective memory István Rév has made the same point about the imperative not to 
repeat the original traumatic event when he analyzed the influence of the 1956 uprising on the 1989 Hungarian 
transition to democracy. Panel “The Hungarian Revolution in the Shifting Mirror of Scholarship and Historical 
Memory.” Bard College, New York, February 16, 2007. Personal attendance and recollection.  
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One of the most iconic images of the 1973 siege at Wounded Knee provides further 
interpretive evidence that the event was a counter-commemoration.25 The photograph by Cy 
Griffin titled “Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee” foregrounds an Indian reclining on a bunker of 
sandbags, propping up on his knee a copy of Dee Brown’s 1970 book of the same title. The 
words on the book’s cover serve to articulate the seriousness of the event. Whether deliberately 
or by accident, the posture of the human form lying on the ground echoes the most famous 
historical photograph of Wounded Knee 1890 - “Big Foot, leader of the Sioux, captured at the 
battle of Wounded Knee, S.D. […] lies frozen on the snow-covered battlefield where he died, 
1890.”26 Through its composition, the photograph served to reactivate a scenario of U.S. national 
memory, and thereby recorded a performance of current ethno-political claims – Native 
sovereignty rights.  
After its duplicitous resolution of the siege of Wounded Knee, the U.S. government 
prosecuted hundreds of AIM members in federal court regardless of the prospects of conviction. 
Yet the radical Indian sovereignty movement did not buckle under this legal assault. With help 
from civil rights lawyers and support from U.S. and European solidarity groups, they defended 
their members in court. When AIM held its first International Indian Treaty Conference in June 
of 1974, they adopted counter-commemorations as one of their public strategies. The minutes of 
the Conference’s June 12 press strategy conference feature the following exchange:  
“[AUBREY] GROSSMAN: 1976 represents for whites their sovereignty, their constitution. Why 
can’t we bring in the Indian past in the 200th anniversary – on this anniversary, complete 
sovereignty for Indians[?] 
RUSS[ELL MEANS]: A coalition we were part of tried to get Bicentennial funding for Indian 
events. About 2 ½ years ago. I testified at hearings, etc., trying to get it to be a “red man theme 
bicentennial.” They had deaf ears. I sa[i]d then that if things don’t change, 1976 is going to be an 
unhappy birthday. 
CARLSON: You should take a significant Indian date for the origin of this anniversary rather 
than an American one.  
                                                          
25 “Wounded Knee, 1973. Photograph by Cy Griffin.” Richard Erdoes Papers. Yale Collection of Western 
Americana, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library. 
http://beinecke.library.yale.edu/dl_crosscollex/brbldl/oneITEM.asp?pid=2001322&iid=1004756&srchtype= . 
Accessed January 16, 2014 
26 “Big Foot, leader of the Sioux, captured at the battle of Wounded Knee, S.D.” Here he lies frozen on the snow-
covered battlefield where he died.” 1890. Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, 1860 – 1985. National 
Archives Online Public Access. Online. http://research.archives.gov/description/530805  Accessed Dec 27, 2013 
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RUSS: But we can use reverse psychology on the U.S.”27 
 
When debating what kinds of anniversaries they should pick for their commemorations, 
these radical Indian activists articulated two possible prongs for their strategy. In Means’ logic, 
Native counter-commemorations of U.S. national anniversaries would have appealed to the self-
image of Euro-Americans by contrasting American Indian realities with the ideals celebrated by 
U.S. national memory. The second method, suggested by Carlson, would pick an Indian 
historical or cultural anniversary to be commemorated at the same time as the U.S. Bicentennial, 
to simultaneously build Native pride and momentum and educate the U.S. public about historical 
justice for Indians. While it is not clear which approach they selected at the meeting, the radical 
Indian sovereignty movement soon adopted the slogan of a larger anti-imperialist 
commemorative coalition, “A Bicentennial without Colonies.”28 
Scenario III: The “Dog Soldier” Uprising, 1976 
In 1834, while wintering at Fort Clark (now North Dakota) with the expedition of 
Prussian Prince Maximilian of Wied-Neuwied, Swiss artist Karl Bodmer painted one of the most 
striking and enduring images of American Indians, Pehriska-Ruhpa of the Dog Society of the 
Hidatsa tribe. After a brief period of prestige and fame in the Plains clashes of the mid-19th 
century,29 Native warrior societies were broken up or driven underground by the Indian policies 
of the Reservation Era. Yet together with Bodmer’s painting, mainstream press and popular 
culture neatly folded the concept of the dog soldier into U.S. and to some extent European 
memory. For many of those involved in the radical Indian sovereignty struggle of the Late Cold 
War – Native activists, their Euro-American and European allies, and their opponents – the 
                                                          
27 “Press Strategy Conference June 12, 1974, Mobridge” (Minutes and transcription by Paula Giese). Roger A. 
Finzel American Indian Movement Papers, Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, 
Albuquerque. 
28 Times-Echo Feb. 1976, 3 
29 For about two decades, especially among the Cheyennes, the dog society achieved prestige and political influence 
by opposing peaceful relations with white settlers and the U.S. government. The subsequent military conflicts with 
the U.S. Army gradually eclipsed the influence of the dog societies. For more on the Cheyenne dog soldiers, see B. 
Keith Murphy, “Dog Soldiers” in Spencer C. Tucker, ed., The Encyclopedia of North American Indian Wars, 1607-
1890 (Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO, LLC, 2011), 242-243; Jean Afton, David Fritjof Halaas, and Andrew E. 
Masich. Cheyenne Dog Soldiers: A Ledgerbook History of Coups and Combat (Niwot: University Press of 
Colorado, 1997), and Jeff Broome, Dog Soldier Justice: The Ordeal of Susanna Alderice in the Kansas Indian War 
(Lincoln: Lincoln County Historical Society, 2003) 
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figure of the warrior/dog soldier reflected a mental concept for the re-enactment of the male 
warrior ethos of American Indian history and cultures.  
In a larger sense, the Red Power Movement of the 1960s had been a revival of traditional 
American Indian masculinities. In their militancy and especially in their dangerous and dramatic 
demonstrations, male activists of a variety of Native nations could re-enact their long eroded 
gender role as protectors, fighters, raiders, hunters and providers for their communities. In a 
more specific sense, however, the American Indian Movement as an organization explicitly 
modeled itself after a traditional warrior society, which Native communities across the U.S. 
could call on to come and help them in a crisis.30 Similar scenarios worked across the Atlantic 
among European hobbyists. In the early 1980s, Peter Bolz reported that German re-enactors of 
the Hunkpapa Lakota “[would] use drawings and paintings by Karl Bodmer as reference and try 
to reproduce the articles depicted there as accurately as possible.” In the same period, the annual 
gatherings of West German Indianist hobbyists over the Pentecost weekend featured “men’s 
societies like the Dog Soldiers, who exercise[d] a kind of police power.”31 As late as the early 
1990s, a Hungarian hobbyist explained to the author that in battle, members of the 19th century 
Plains dog societies would pin their sashes to the ground to signal that they will fight until they 
win or die – and that they would do this in order to cover the withdrawal of their people.32 It was 
this fascination with the (potentially secret) soldiers’ societies of the Plains Indian nations, and 
with the dog soldier who is willing to fight to the death for his cause that was at the core of some 
of the performances of the activists, allies and opponents of the radical Indian sovereignty 
movement.33  
                                                          
30 “AIM is the new warrior class of the century, bound by the bond of the drum, who vote with our bodies instead of 
our mouths. Our business is hope.” Birgit Kills Straight quoted in Dennis Banks and Richard Erdoes,  Ojibwa 
Warrior: Dennis Banks and the Rise of the American Indian Movement (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
2004), 58. Also see Paul Chaat Smith and Robert Allen Warrior, Like a Hurricane: The Indian Movement from 
Alcatraz to Wounded Knee (New York: The New Press, 1996), 137-138. 
31 Peter Bolz, “Life Among the “Hunkpapas”: A Case Study of German Indian Lore.” In Christian F. Feest, ed., 
Indians and Europe: An Interdisciplinary Collection of Essays (Aachen: Edition Herodot Rader-Verlag, 1987), 486, 
487; also Friedrich von Borries and Jens-Uwe Fischer, Sozialistische Cowboys: Der Wilde Westen Ostdeutschlands 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2008), 141. 
32 Personal recollection. 
33 My analysis of the warrior ethos does not mean to say that Native women did not play a significant role in the 
Indian sovereignty struggle. Historians of the movement and AIM leaders have discussed women’s interventions at 
pivotal moments, their profound influence on the struggle’s direction, goals and strategies, their leadership, and their 
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Even before it classified AIM as a domestic terrorist group, the U.S. government had 
responded to Native counter-commemorations with alarm and mobilization of force. By early 
1976, the relations between the radical Indian sovereignty movement and the U.S. government 
had reached a low point. Since the deadly standoff and firefights of Wounded Knee 1973, the 
confrontations, however sporadic, had even increased in intensity. On June 26 1975, after an FBI 
car drove onto the Jumping Bull Ranch of the Pine Ridge Reservation of South Dakota, a 
firefight ensued with Indians at the site. When the dust settled, one Indian and two FBI agents 
lay dead. In the following months, U.S. federal authorities arrested Dino Butler and Bob 
Robideau, and conducted a man hunt for AIM leader Dennis Banks on charges from Wounded 
Knee and previous activities. After being on the run for over 7 months, in February 1976 AIM 
member Leonard Peltier was finally extradited from Canada to the U.S. government.34 That same 
month, the dead body of AIM activist Anna Mae Aquash was found on the Pine Ridge 
Reservation. A delayed autopsy revealed that she had been shot dead at point blank range. By 
early 1976, the U.S. federal government was prosecuting AIM in the courts, and hunting its 
leaders as armed and dangerous.  Both the federal authorities and the Indian activists were on 
edge. 
In this climate of mutual suspicion often bordering on paranoia, in late May 1976 the 
director of the FBI sent a memorandum to major government agencies. The memo warned that 
according to an unnamed source, so-called “dog soldiers” affiliated with AIM had been training 
to engage in guerilla warfare against non-Indians and the government after gathering at the sun 
dance and the International Indian Treaty Conference, to be held on the Yankton Sioux 
Reservation of South Dakota in June of that year.35  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
supreme sacrifice for the cause. Female members of AIM and other Indian rights organizations, including Mary 
Crow Dog / Brave Bird and Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz have also articulated a Native feminism that trenchantly 
critiques the male-dominant character of the movement even as it supports its goals and members. For more, see 
Mary Crow Dog and Richard Erdoes, Lakota Woman (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1990), Mary Brave Bird with 
Richard Erdoes, Ohitika Woman (New York: Grove Press, 1993), and Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, Blood on the Border: 
A Memoir of the Contra War. (Cambridge, Mass.: South End Press, 2005) 
34 In 1977 Peltier was be convicted for killing the two FBI agents, and given two consecutive life sentences. Over 
the following 3 decades, one of the major campaigns of the International Indian Treaty Council was to raise 
international support for the release of Leonard Peltier as a political prisoner of the U.S. justice system.  
35 “American Indian Movement.” May 1976 telegram from the Director of the FBI to Deputy Attorney General’s 
Analysis and Evaluation Unit, the Attorney General’s sections of General Crimes and Internal Security, the U.S. 
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If read as a script for a performance, the document projects a scenario of domestic 
terrorism. After receiving their specific assignments, the “dog soldiers” would wreak havoc 
across the state of South Dakota. They would blow up the Lakes Andes Court House and the Fort 
Randall Dam; hit the Sioux Falls State Penitentiary to kill an inmate; attack farmers, shoot up 
equipment, and blow up the Bureau of Indian Affairs buildings in the Wagner area; invade 
Mount Rushmore and the State Capitol in Pierre; attempt to assassinate the governor of South 
Dakota; and put out snipers to shoot tourists along the South Dakota interstate highway.36 
However, this scenario is also reminiscent of the popular accounts of Indian raids against 
white settlers on the American frontier. Under the pretense of the traditional cultural and spiritual 
event of the Sioux sun dance and the Indian treaty conference, the crazed “dog soldiers” of the 
radical Indian sovereignty movement were reported to be preparing to turn the region’s 
Bicentennial celebrations into chaos, sabotage, and bloodbath. Here, the FBI memo relied on the 
mental image of the “dog soldiers” to re-activate the scenario of an Indian uprising familiar from 
Euro-American historical memory. By implication, the document does not allow for further 
verification; it easily suggests that the only way to respond to this information is by a 
preventative performance – ‘hit them before they strike.’ Acquired by and published in the press, 
among Euro-Americans this 1976 telegram likely evoked the same kind of terror that had in the 
previous centuries swept the frontier whenever Native groups gathered to observe their own 
cultural events – the kind of terror which led to the U.S. Army’s massacre of the Indian ghost 
dancers at Wounded Knee in 1890.37  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Marshals Service, the U.S Secret Service, and the Department of the Interior. 1-3. Roger A. Finzel American Indian 
Movement Papers. Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque. 
36 “American Indian Movement.” May 1976 telegram from the Director of the FBI to Deputy Attorney General’s 
Analysis and Evaluation Unit, the Attorney General’s sections of General Crimes and Internal Security, the U.S. 
Marshals Service, the U.S Secret Service, and the Department of the Interior. 3. Roger A. Finzel American Indian 
Movement Papers. Center for Southwest Research, University of New Mexico, Albuquerque. 
37 It may not be far-fetched to suggest that there is a continuity between Euro-American panics and policy about 
Indian gatherings such as those at Wounded Knee in 1890, 1973, 1976, and the fact that after the September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks, several U.S. government legal briefs were based on strategies used by the U.S. military 
against the Seminoles in Florida. “Andrew Jackson’s Actions Model Anti-Speech, Perpetual War Legislation.” By 
Gale Courey Toensing, Indian Country Today Media Network, June 7, 2011. Online: 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/06/07/andrew-jacksons-actions-model-anti-speech-perpetual-war-
legislation-37239  ; “Welcome to the United Police State of America.” By Gale Courey Toensing, Indian Country 
Today Media Network, December 8, 2011. Online: 
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Whose ‘Spirit of ‘76’?: Native Counter-Commemorations of the Bi/Centennial 
 Even as several Indian rights organizations issued their own press statements to refute the 
charges made in the FBI’s “dog soldiers” memo, the federal government moved to classify the 
radical Indian sovereignty movement as an enemy of the state. On June 18 1976, the U.S. 
Senate’s Committee on the Judiciary held a hearing in its “Subcommittee to Investigate the 
Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws.” Resulting in a 
168-page document titled “Threats to the Peaceful Observance of the Bicentennial,”38 their 
quasi-judicial performance was recognition that the symbolic significance of the U.S. 
Bicentennial commemorations made them a stage for performances of ethno-political rights. The 
U.S. government had learned from the radical civil rights guerilla theater and the recent counter-
commemorative performances of the radical Indian sovereignty movement, and was now 
determined to prevent the disruptions of the Bicentennial by Native critiques of Euro-American 
historical memory and Indian policy. 
 More than the hearing’s specific testimonies, the documents submitted, including 
newspaper articles, press releases, letters, and fliers, enabled the Subcommittee to link various 
organizations in the radical Indian sovereignty movement to a larger coalition of U.S. and 
foreign radical groups, some of which had advocated violent action or had engaged in it. 
Through their leaders and activists like Clyde and Vernon Bellecourt and Jimmie Durham, the 
American Indian Movement, its International Indian Treaty Council, and the recently established 
Native American Solidarity Committee were shown to be cooperating with the so-called “July 4 
Coalition.” As a larger solidarity alliance of a variety of leftist and radical organizations 
including the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the Puerto Rican Solidarity Committee, the 
July 4 Coalition was organizing counterdemonstrations for the period of the official U.S. 
governmental commemorations of the Bicentennial. One of the Coalition’s member 
organizations was the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee, which may have been linked to the 
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January 16, 2014 
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United States Senate, Ninety-Fourth Congress, Second Session, June 18, 1976.” U.S. Government Printing Office, 
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Weatherman / Weather Underground, a group that had engaged in violence including the 
bombing of government buildings to protest the U.S. intervention in Vietnam. The 
Subcommittee specifically used these ties to include AIM, the Treaty Council, and the Solidarity 
Committee in its list of organizations that were potentially planning terrorist acts over the 
Bicentennial season.39 Even though the hearing was ostensibly convened to prevent the 
disruption of the commemorations by informing the general public,40 its performance and the 
resulting document in effect classified the radical Indian sovereignty movement as a terrorist 
threat to the internal security of the U.S. nation state.  
 To be sure, the Native sovereignty movement planned to participate in what Bodnar 
would call a “vernacular” form of historical memory. According to the “National Work Plan” of 
the July 4th Coalition,  
“The government is claiming that the bicentennial is a celebration of the great things it has done 
and of the great individuals who have led the government. It is an analysis absent of any popular 
content, of any historical vision; it is not true. 
Our analysis concentrates not on dates, nor individuals, nor, for that matter, the government. It 
concentrates on the people who have lived and fought in this country – who have built this 
country and who have been robbed over hundreds of years, of the benefits of their work. Ours is a 
history of struggle. 
The government would like to represent unity behind its policies in the bicentennial celebration. 
In our action we want to show unity in struggle. 
So, while the government will feature Gerald Ford, the Pope and the Queen of England, followed 
by a march of the states and a giant carnival in Philadelphia, we will do what we have to.  
Our march will also be a march of the various geographical sectors of this country, contingent by 
contingent, with banners identifying them and, when possible, with some kind of impressive 
production – perhaps a float, small marching band… whatever. 
The march could also contain specific contingents from specific organizations and should be led 
by the large contingent which we hope will be mobilized by the American Indian Movement. 41 
 
                                                          
39 Ibid., 16. 
40 It is likely that in light of the recent scandal over the FBI “dog soldiers” memo, the Subcommittee toned down its 
rhetoric to appease South Dakota Senator James Abourezk, whose son Charles had been implicated, and who sat on 
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. See Senator Thurmond’s opening statement, and also Martha Roundtree’s 
testimory. Ibid., 2, 3-4. 
41 Ibid., 85 
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The July 4th Coalition planned to counter the government’s official bicentennial celebrations 
with vernacular commemorations. As their Marxist-inflected movement discourse reveals, the 
organizers both aimed to expand the regional representation of the commemorations (from the 
Eastern Seaboard to “various [other] geographical sectors of this country”) and to enshrine the 
historical experiences of non-dominant ethnicities, “races” and classes. They hoped to shift the 
focus from the kind of memory that privileged the political history made by triumphant 
individuals to a memory of groups struggling to develop, access and keep resources, a share of 
the nation’s wealth – working people, minorities, immigrants, and Native Americans. In this, the 
Coalition aimed to re-activate the Bicentennial’s scenario of a group of aggrieved North 
American colonists declaring independence from the oppressive rule of the British Empire – to 
articulate the claims for rights of other marginalized groups in U.S. history and the present. Even 
though it was to make similar statements about Americanness, what would have distinguished 
this counter-commemoration from the age-old practice of Euro-Americans “playing Indian”42 
was the participation of an actual Native delegation as the vanguard of the march. 
 While the measures of the U.S. government outlined above seriously hindered the 
alternative vernacular commemorations of the Bicentennial, some American Indian activists did 
hold their own observations of ‘the spirit of ‘76’. Back in 1972, as part of the national Trail of 
Broken Treaties march on Washington, D.C. timed for the presidential elections, three Native 
caravans crossed the United States, visiting Indian reservations, as well as indigenous sacred and 
historic sites. One of these Indian caravans stopped at the Little Big Horn national battlefield of 
Montana, where the marchers attempted to erect an alternative monument to their heroes of the 
famous battle. While on this occasion they were prevented from completing their plan by the 
National Park Service,43 the mere participation in such a project likely strengthened their pan-
Indian identity and sense of shared purpose.  
 As a result of this earlier attempt at a counter-memorial, even though the Custer 
Centennial Committee hoped to hold a large and well-publicized ceremony, the National Park 
                                                          
42 Phrasing and conceptual framework from Philip J. Deloria, Playing Indian (New Haven, London: Yale University 
Press, 1998) 
43 Dennis Banks and Richard Erdoes, Ojibwa Warrior: Dennis Banks and the Rise of the American Indian 
Movement (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004), 128-129 
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Service downgraded both the size and the fanfare of the planned observation of the battle’s 
anniversary in 1976. Professedly aimed at providing a more balanced account of the original 
event, the centennial commemoration began in the shadow of the 1881 granite pillar featuring 
the names of 200 of the U.S. soldiers who fell on the battlefield. The commemoration was 
interrupted by the unscheduled appearance of a hundred Native American demonstrators led by 
AIM’s Russell Means, who marched in singing and drumming, and carried an upside-down U.S. 
flag, AIM’s symbol of an America in national distress. While they allowed the ceremony to 
continue, 44 the Native demonstrators nevertheless provided a poignant reminder of the defiant 
presence of one of the parties involved in the original event.  
 Now under a president who had first made a name for himself by acting in Westerns 
(filmic commemorations of the Euro-American conquest of Native land), the Indian 
demonstrators returned to the Little Big Horn in 1988. After participating in the annual Indian 
peace ceremony on the battlefield, a crowd of Sioux, Cheyenne, Arapaho and Crow planted a 
metal plaque memorial to “the Indian Patriots who fought and defeated” General Custer’s 7th 
Cavalry troops in an attempt “to save our women and children from mass murder”, and thereby 
protected Indian “rights to our Homelands, Treaties, and Sovereignty.” Located on Last Stand 
Hill next to the granite pillar commemorating Custer and his men, the Indian plaque was 
objected to but nevertheless left in place by the National Park Service,45 and remained the only 
Native marker at the site until a more permanent Indian memorial was erected in 2003.46 
 In their 1972, 1976 and 1988 counter-commemorations, Native sovereignty activists re-
activated the scenario of the 1876 Battle at the Little Big Horn, which in officially sanctioned US 
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national memory is the story of the heroic last stand of a handful of white cavalrymen against a 
multitude of bloodthirsty savage Indians. This time, American Indians assumed honored their 
ancestors who fought in the battle, forcefully inserted Native perspectives into the memory 
narrative, and to some extent assumed the mantle of the united tribes of 1876 to wage the current 
battles for American Indian sovereignty rights.  
 At the 1988 counter-commemoration, in his characteristically assertive style Russell 
Means warned the Custerphiles in his audience that if “you remove our monument, […] we’ll 
remove yours,” and explained that the Custer memorial had meant to Indians what a memorial to 
Hitler and his SS storm troopers erected in Jerusalem would mean to Israelis. “Archeologists, 
anthropologists and historians have produced a monument like that - a monument that was 
named for him, named for a mass murderer. Custer's road to the White House was going to be 
paved with our blood.”47 In his speech Russell Means in effect indicted the official 
memorialization of the Battle of the Little Big Horn, indirectly criticized President Ronald 
Reagan, forcefully providing a vernacular critique of the Anglo-American historical memory of 
the military conflicts between the U.S. government and American Indians. 
 The Native counter-commemorations in 1976 and 1988 indeed performed ‘the spirit of 
’76’ – a vernacular and revolutionary tradition, but not always that of 1776. Rather, they used 
official forms of memorialization to commemorate the Indian involvement in U.S. historical 
events with a focus on the geography and chronology of Native America. The planned Indian 
participation in the July 4 Coalition’s “People’s Bicentennial” was to legitimize the vernacular 
commemoration and dramatize the struggle of the continent’s native inhabitants against 
colonization, thus in a sense re-appropriating the revolutionary spirit of 1776. The Native 
demonstrations at the Little Big Horn national battlefield commemorated the pan-Indian military 
resistance to Euro-American colonization – the spirit of 1876. Importantly, both events were 
counter-commemorations, forms which use official memory culture to articulate a marginal 
group’s critique of the status quo. 
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Conclusion 
These and other cases prove that, far from being haphazard events, Native counter-
commemorations were strategically calculated interventions in U.S. national memory for Indian 
sovereignty rights. By the time AIM was classified as a potential terrorist organization in 1976, 
they had ‘hijacked’ the Thanksgiving commemoration ceremonies at Plymouth, Massachusetts in 
1970; they had camped out on Mount Rushmore, South Dakota in the same year; they had 
occupied and held the village of Wounded Knee in South Dakota for over two months in 1973; 
and they had been planning to conduct their own commemoration ceremony at the Little Big 
Horn battlefield in Montana in the summer of 1976. Native counter-commemorations continued 
after the end of the Cold War. Since the 1970s, AIM has been trying to redefine the U.S. national 
festivals of Thanksgiving and Columbus Day, the latter of which also included disruptions of the 
Columbus Day marches in Denver since the 1990s.48 One of the fruits of such Native 
interventions in Euro-American (and European) historical memory was the United Nations’ 
International Year of the World's Indigenous People in 1993, itself a kind of counter-
commemoration of Columbus’ voyage in 1492.  
The final corollary of this analysis is a proposal to identify a counter use of memory for 
social justice and political causes. Counter-commemorations are an example of how 
marginalized groups can creatively use national public memory to campaign for political rights 
and social justice. On a more theoretical level, the concept of counter-commemorations reminds 
us that manifestations of memory do not fall into neat categories, but are often relational: social 
groups creatively use national memory to promote their own causes. Out of the American 
indigenous counter-commemorations of the Columbus Quincentenary of 1992, Roger I. Simon 
issued a call for scholars and practitioners to engage in a sustained pedagogy of an “insurgen[t] 
production of popular memories.”49 Increased attention to the forms and functions of counter-
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commemorations may enrich scholarly analyses, and it may add much to the practitioner’s tool 
kit of strategies for social justice. 
 
 
